When establishing the interest rates and structures (and the amounts and structures of certain fees constituting interest under federal and state banking laws, such as origination fees, late fees and non-sufficient funds fees) that are charged to borrowers on loans originated on our marketplace, our lending partners rely on certain authority under federal law to export the interest rate requirements of each lending partner's home state. Further, we, our securitization vehicles and our institutional investors that purchase Upstart-powered loans originated by our lending partners rely on the ability, as subsequent holders of the loans, to continue charging the interest rates and fee structures and enforce other contractual terms agreed to between the lending partners and the borrowers, as permitted under federal banking laws. The current maximum annual percentage rate of the loans facilitated through our marketplace is 35.99%. In some states, the interest rates of certain Upstart-powered loans exceed the maximum interest rate permitted for consumer loans applicable to non-bank lenders to borrowers residing in, or that have nexus to, such states. Several states have also introduced legislation to prevent state-chartered banks from exporting their higher interest rates into the states choosing to opt out of the federal law that allows this practice. In addition, the rate structures for Upstart-powered loans may not be permissible in all states for non-bank purchasers and/or the amount or structures of certain fees charged in connection with Upstart-powered loans may not be permissible in all states for non-bank purchasers. Furthermore, other states have proposed or enacted additional limitations on interest rates and fees, such as laws in Illinois, Maine and New Mexico that cap interest rates on certain loans at an "all-in" 36% APR.
Usury, fee, and disclosure related claims involving Upstart-powered loans may be raised in multiple ways. We or the participants in our marketplace, including lending partners and institutional investors, may face litigation, government enforcement or other challenges, for example, based on claims that our lending partners did not establish loan terms that were permissible in the state they were located or did not correctly identify the home or host state in which they were located for purposes of interest exportation authority under federal law. Alternatively, we or our institutional investors may face litigation, government enforcement or other challenge, for example, based on claims that rates and fees were lawful at origination and through any period during which the lending partner retained the loan and interests therein, but following the sale of loans, we or other purchasers of the loans, including our institutional investors, are not permitted to enforce the loans pursuant to their contracted-for terms, or that while certain disclosures were not required at origination because the loans were originated by banks, they may be required following the sale of such loans.
In Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 2505 (June 27, 2016), for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the non-bank purchaser of defaulted credit card debt could not rely on preemption standards under the National Bank Act applicable to the originator of such debt in defense of usury claims. The Madden case addressed circumstances under which a defaulted extension of credit under a consumer credit card account was assigned, following default, to a non-bank debt buyer that then attempted to collect the loan and to continue charging interest at the contracted-for rate. The debtor filed a suit claiming, among other claims, that the rate charged by the non-bank collection entity exceeded the usury rates allowable for such entities under New York usury law. Reversing a lower court decision, the Second Circuit held that preemption standards under the National Bank Act applicable to the bank that issued the credit card were not available to the non-bank debt buyer as a defense to usury claims. Following denial of a petition for rehearing by the Second Circuit, the defendant sought review by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 27, 2016, and therefore, the Second Circuit's decision remains binding on federal courts in the Second Circuit (which include all federal courts in New York, Connecticut, and Vermont). Upon remand to the District Court for consideration of additional issues, the parties settled the matter in 2019.
The scope and validity of the Second Circuit's Madden decision remain subject to challenge and clarification. For example, the Colorado Administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code, or the UCCC, reached a settlement with respect to complaints against two online lending platforms whose operations share certain commonalities with ours, including with respect to the role of lending partners originating loans and non-bank purchasers of such loans. The complaints included, among other claims, allegations, grounded in the Second Circuit's Madden decision, that the rates and fees for certain loans could not be enforced lawfully by non-bank purchasers of bank-originated loans. Under the settlement, the banks and non-bank purchasers committed to, among other things, limit the annual percentage rates, or APR, on loans to Colorado consumers to 36% and take other actions to ensure that the banks were in fact the true lenders. The non-bank purchasers also agreed to obtain and maintain a Colorado lending license. In Colorado, this settlement created a helpful model for what constitutes an acceptable bank partnership model; however, Colorado passed legislation to opt out of the federal law that allows state-chartered banks to export their rates, with such law scheduled to become effective July 1, 2024 but was later subject to an injunction pending the outcome of a legal challenge of the law. Regardless, the settlement may also invite other states to initiate their own actions, and set their own regulatory standards through enforcement.
In addition, in June 2019, private plaintiffs filed class action complaints against multiple traditional credit card securitization programs, including, Petersen, et al. v. Chase Card Funding, LLC, et al., (No. 1:19-cv-00741-LJV-JJM (W.D.N.Y. June 6, 2019)) and Cohen, et al. v. Capital One Funding, LLC et al., (No. 19-03479 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2019)). In Petersen, the plaintiffs sought class action status against certain defendants affiliated with a national bank that have acted as special purpose entities in securitization transactions sponsored by the bank. The complaint alleges that the defendants' acquisition, collection and enforcement of the bank's credit card receivables violated New York's civil usury law and that, as in Madden, the defendants, as non-bank entities, are not entitled to the benefit of federal preemption of state usury law. The complaint sought a judgment declaring the receivables unenforceable, monetary damages and other legal and equitable remedies, such as disgorgement of all sums paid in excess of the usury limit. Cohen was a materially similar claim against another national bank. On January 22, 2020, the magistrate judge in Petersen issued a report and recommendation responding to the defendants' motion to dismiss. The magistrate recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted as to both of the plaintiffs' claims (usury and unjust enrichment). On September 21, 2020, the District Court accepted the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed all claims. The District Court found that the usury claims were expressly preempted by the National Bank Act and referenced the OCC's recent rulemaking (discussed further below) that "[i]nterest on a loan that is permissible under [the National Bank Act] shall not be affected by the sale, assignment, or other transfer of the loan." Among other things, the Court deferred to the "OCC's reasoned judgment that enforcing New York's usury laws against the Chase defendants would significantly interfere with [the bank's] exercise of its [National Bank Act] powers." The Cohen case was dismissed on September 29, 2020. The plaintiffs in both Cohen and Petersen filed, but ultimately dropped, their appeals of the decision to the second circuit.
As noted above, federal prudential regulators have also taken actions to address the Madden decision. On May 29, 2020, the OCC issued a final rule clarifying that, when a national bank or savings association sells, assigns, or otherwise transfers a loan, interest permissible before the transfer continues to be permissible after the transfer. That rule took effect on August 3, 2020. Similarly, the FDIC finalized on June 25, 2020 its 2019 proposal declaring that the interest rate for a loan is determined when the loan is made, and will not be affected by subsequent events. On July 29, 2020, California, New York and Illinois filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to enjoin enforcement of the OCC rule (Case No. 20-CV-5200) and, similarly in the same court, on August 20, 2020 California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia sought to enjoin enforcement of the FDIC rule (Case No. 20-CV-5860), in each case related to permissible interest rates post-loan transfer on the grounds that the OCC and FDIC exceeded their authority when promulgating those rules. While the court ruled in favor of the OCC and FDIC holding that the agencies did not exceed their statutory authorities when promulgating their "valid when made" rules, there is risk that the OCC and FDIC rules continue to be challenged or are repealed in the future through legislation.
There are factual distinctions between our program and the circumstances addressed in the Second Circuit's Madden decision, as well as the circumstances in the Colorado UCCC settlement, credit card securitization litigation, and similar cases. As noted above, there are also bases on which the Madden decision's validity might be subject to challenge or the Madden decision may be addressed by federal regulation or legislation. Nevertheless,there can be no guarantee that a Madden-like claim will not be brought successfully against us, our lending partners or our institutional investors.
Effective October 2021, Maine updated its Consumer Credit Code to include a statutory "true lender" test, providing that an entity is a "lender" subject to certain requirements of the Consumer Credit Code if the person, among other things: (i) has the predominant economic interest in a loan; (ii) brokers, arranges, or facilitates a loan and has the right to purchase the loan; or (iii) based on the totality of the circumstances, appears to be the lender, and the transaction is structured to evade certain statutory requirements. Me. Rev. Stat. § 2-702. Connecticut and Minnesota codified a "true lender" test into their laws in 2023, which similarly focus on the totality of the circumstances or who has the "predominant economic interest" in the loans. Most recently, Washington passed a true lender law that became effective June 6, 2024. More states may also institute similar statutory "true lender" tests. The statutory "true lender" tests may increase the risk of true lender litigation in certain jurisdictions and impact how the tests are applied by courts and regulators in determining the true lender. They may also result in increased usury and licensing risk. Other states may take different paths to promulgate similar "true lender" restrictions, and if not through a legislative path, impacted parties may have little to no advance notice of new restrictions and compliance obligations.
If a borrower or any state agency were to successfully bring a claim against us, our lending partners, our securitization vehicles and/or the trustees of such vehicles or our institutional investors for a state usury law or fee restriction violation and the rate or fee at issue on the loan was impermissible under applicable state law, we, our lending partners, securitization vehicles and/or trustees or institutional investors may face various commercial and legal repercussions, including that such parties would not receive the total amount of interest expected, and in some cases, may not receive any interest or principal, may hold loans that are void, voidable, rescindable, or otherwise impaired or may be subject to monetary, injunctive or criminal penalties. Were such repercussions to apply to us, we may suffer direct monetary loss or may be a less attractive candidate for lending partners, securitization trustees or institutional investors to enter into or renew relationships; and were such repercussions to apply to our lending partners or institutional investors, such parties could be discouraged from using our marketplace. We may also be subject to payment of damages in situations where we agreed to provide indemnification, as well as fines and penalties assessed by state and federal regulatory agencies.