Following a period of extreme escalation in early 2025, where U.S. duties on Chinese imports reached a peak of 145% (inclusive of a 125% reciprocal tariff and a 20% fentanyl-related surcharge), the trade environment has transitioned into a complex, multi-layered duty regime. As of January 2026, we remain subject to a combined 20% International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA")-based baseline duty on Chinese imports (10% reciprocal and 10% fentanyl-related), which stacks upon existing Section 301 duties, standard most-favored-nation rates as well as applicable Section 232 duties. Beyond China, the U.S. government has transitioned the 10% IEEPA baseline into a permanent Reciprocal Tariff Schedule, affecting nearly all global imports. This regime imposes variable, country-specific duties that fluctuate based on the perceived "reciprocity" of a trading partner's own tariff walls. In February 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the IEEPA does not authorize the U.S. President to impose tariffs, invalidating both the "reciprocal" tariffs and the country-specific tariffs. However, the U.S. President took steps to impose new tariffs under other authorities.
Separately, in April 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce initiated an investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 into the national security implications of imports of semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and their derivative products and concluded that additional tariffs on specific covered products are appropriate, subject to several end-use exemptions.
The U.S. government has also imposed global tariffs on certain critical raw materials, including steel, aluminum, and copper, and certain products, such as passenger vehicles and light trucks. Further, the Chinese government has imposed trade restrictions on certain rare earth elements critical to many advanced manufacturing, computing and defense applications and has implemented extra-territorial controls on items produced outside of China that are made with such elements. The continuation or expansion of the scope or amount of such global raw material or product-based tariffs or restrictions could significantly increase our costs or have an adverse effect on the end markets we support. Attempts to mitigate the impact of tariffs could cause us to sub-optimize operations, increasing our cost to operate. Tariffs have increased, and will continue to increase, the cost of our materials and lead us to apply surcharges or raise prices, which could reduce demand for our products. Customers and end-users may delay, reduce, or cancel spending on projects involving our products, negatively impacting demand and our financial results. Our mitigation efforts and price increases may not fully offset the impact of tariffs and may result in lowering our margin on products sold. If the U.S. government expands or adopts additional tariffs, or if other countries retaliate, the resulting trade barriers could have a significant adverse impact on our suppliers, our customers and on our business. The volatility and unpredictability of international trade policies and conditions add further complexity to our operations, making it challenging to forecast and plan effectively. We cannot predict the future trade policy of the United States or of any foreign countries in which we operate or purchase goods, or the terms of any trade agreements or their impact on our business. The continued adoption and expansion of tariffs, quotas and embargoes, the occurrence or threat of a trade war or other governmental action related to tariffs or trade agreements or policies, has the potential to adversely impact demand for our products, our costs, our customers, our suppliers and the world and U.S. economies, which in turn could have a material adverse effect on our business, operating results and financial condition.
In addition, "Entity List" designations and "military end-user" controls have been significantly expanded, as have some rules relating to items produced outside the United States that incorporate more than de minimis levels of U.S. controlled content or that are derived from (i.e., the "direct product" of) U.S. origin technologies, equipment or software. In October 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security ("BIS") implemented new and novel restrictions related to end-uses in semiconductor, semiconductor manufacturing, supercomputer, and advanced computing, along with certain equipment used to develop and produce them, as well as controls around the activities of U.S. persons in certain markets, including China. These regulations, which BIS has amended several times since initial publication (as amended, the "BIS Rules"), have resulted in, and may in the future result in, loss of business, both directly to China end-customers, and indirectly through our OEM customers, as well as additional export license requirements on shipments of our products, parts and supplies, and associated increased administrative burdens. For example, as a result of the initial BIS Rules promulgated in late 2022, we experienced an annual loss in net revenues of approximately $200 million to $250 million, most of which was realized in 2023. The extraordinary complexity of these rules, combined with their continued modification and the likelihood of further amendments from BIS, significantly increases our risk of non-compliance, which could result in fines and other penalties, and could change how these rules impact us. The U.S. government and other government agencies may promulgate new or additional export licensing or other regulations that have the effect of further limiting our ability to provide certain products and services to customers outside the United States, including China. The U.S. government may also revise or expand existing regulations or issue guidance clarifying the scope and application of these requirements, which could change the impact of these rules on our business and manufacturing operations. While we continue to adjust our policies and practices to ensure compliance with these regulations, and seek to mitigate their impact, there can be no assurances that current or future regulations, by the United States or other countries, will not have a material adverse effect on our business.
Since the beginning of 2019, regulatory changes have been implemented at an unprecedented pace, which increases the resources needed to monitor and comply with regulations, while heightening the risk of non-compliance. Such regulatory changes include the addition by BIS of China-based Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. ("Huawei"), Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation ("SMIC"), Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp ("YMTC"), NAURA Technology Group, Piotech, Inc. and many of their respective affiliates onto its Entity List. Accordingly, we have implemented additional monitoring processes and suspended orders from these companies as well as other designated Chinese-based customers, where those orders are subject to U.S. jurisdiction. We were previously negatively impacted by the cancellation of orders from customers who are suppliers to these firms, and we could be negatively impacted in the future by further amendments to the Entity List. In addition, BIS has modified the Foreign Direct Product, De Minimis and "military end-use" rules, expanded the scope of products and technologies that would require licenses for military end-uses, primarily in China, and expanded the list of "military end users," mostly in China, further limiting our sales. At the same time, BIS and the U.S. Department of Defense have also added numerous China-based companies, including companies with which we do business, to the "Unverified List," and "Chinese Military Companies" list, respectively. Placement on such lists may be an indication of additional future restrictions by the U.S. government, as was the case with YMTC, which was added to the Unverified List in October 2022 and was then added to the Entity List in December 2022.
Increased restrictions on China have led to and may continue to lead to regulatory retaliation by the Chinese government and further escalate geopolitical tensions between China and Taiwan. For example, in 2019, China's Ministry of Commerce announced an "unreliable entity list" under which non-Chinese entities that cut off supply to Chinese companies may be subject to government action. Because many of the mechanisms for being named to the list, removed from the list, and enforcement remain ill-defined, the potential impacts of the regulation remain unknown. In addition, in 2023, China adopted export curbs on crucial raw materials, including gallium, germanium, and graphite, that had both direct and indirect adverse impacts on our business and supply chain. In December 2024, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce imposed stricter export control restrictions on the export to the United States of gallium, germanium and other materials with potential dual-use applications, thereby increasing the adverse impact on our business, costs and supply chain. In April 2025, China implemented new export restrictions on certain rare earth minerals, including yttrium, which is a critical component used in the manufacturing of our lasers. As a result, we expect to encounter challenges in sourcing this and other critical materials, along with higher costs and potential supply chain disruptions, which may materially harm our business, financial condition and operating results. Additionally, as a result of Chinese extra-territorial controls, we expect increased compliance burdens and risk of violations, which also have the potential to harm our business, financial condition and operating results.
The ongoing geopolitical tensions and economic uncertainty between the United States and its trading partners caused by recent tariffs, Entity List and "military end user" designations, foreign-made product rules and the BIS Rules, and the unknown impact of current and future trade regulations, may continue to increase costs, as well as restrict our ability to sell, or decrease demand from customers to purchase, our products, directly and indirectly, which could materially harm our business, financial condition and operating results. This trade uncertainty has caused, and may continue to cause, customers to delay or cancel orders, as they mitigate the risk to their own supply chain and cost exposure by sourcing from locally based suppliers or suppliers based in other countries. Such delays and cancellations could have a material impact on our business, financial condition and operating results. It is possible that additional trade restrictions will be imposed, and that existing tariffs will be increased on imports of our products or the components used in our products and/or that our business will be impacted by additional retaliatory tariffs, policies that favor domestic industries, or restrictions imposed and/or increased by China or other countries in response to existing or future tariffs. These developments could cause us to lose additional sales and customers, incur increased costs and lower margins, seek alternative suppliers, raise prices or make changes to our operations, any of which could materially harm our business, financial condition and operating results.