Telefónica's international presence enables the diversification of its activities across countries and regions, but it exposes Telefónica to diverse legislation, as well as to the political and economic environments of the countries in which it operates. Any adverse developments in these countries, such as economic uncertainty, inflationary pressures, rapid normalization of monetary policy, exchange rate or sovereign-risk fluctuations, as well as growing geopolitical tensions, may adversely affect Telefónica's business, financial position, debt management, cash flows and results of operations and/or the performance of some or all of the Group's financial indicators.
In recent years, successive shocks have ushered in a period characterized by extraordinary uncertainty and the simultaneous occurrence of multiple negative disruptions. Inflationary pressures arising from bottlenecks associated with the rapid post-pandemic recovery, coupled with increases in commodity prices, led to a robust response from central banks (raising interest rates and withdrawing liquidity from the system) and a significant loss of purchasing power for consumers. Additionally, the recent higher wage demands observed internationally, reflecting both the strength of labour markets, especially those in major developed economies, and the prevalence (though to a lesser extent than in the past) of wage indexation mechanisms, have also contributed to these inflationary pressures.
Although inflationary pressures eased in 2024, there are recent signs that progress is stalling in some countries where the Group operates, or even reversing course as in Brazil. Price pressures and relatively high interest rates persist in many countries. Geopolitical events such as the Russia-Ukraine war, armed conflict and political instability in the Middle East and the possible imposition of tariffs by major economies pose risks to inflation dynamics, interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, there is a risk that the decrease in global liquidity and higher-for-longer interest rates could generate increased financial volatility, giving rise to new stress episodes, especially if inflation proves to be more persistent than expected. Additionally, premature monetary easing by central banks could lead to resurgent inflation, potentially triggering a new stagflation period akin to the 1970s.
Looking forward, elements that could worsen the effects of the current situation include the escalation of armed conflicts and potential disruptions to energy and goods supply, as well as possible additional increases in commodity prices. This could result in a potential de-anchoring of inflation expectations and higher-than-expected wage hikes, prolonging and amplifying the inflation-recession scenario. As a consequence of the above, economic growth is expected to remain weak in the short term, with the risk of recession still present in some parts of the world.
So far, the main European countries where the Group operates have been affected by the ongoing geopolitical conflicts mainly through the price channel (higher commodity prices, intermediate inputs and salary costs, among others), as their direct trade and financial exposure is limited. However, there continues to be a concern in Europe about energy dependence in the face of potential episodes of gas shortages and lengthening energy transition. Latin America could be affected by lower external demand associated with slower global growth, deteriorating terms of trade, tighter financial conditions and doubts about debt sustainability.
As of December 31, 2024, the contribution of each segment to the Telefónica Group's total assets was as follows: Telefónica Spain 25.7% (26.0% as of December 31, 2023), VMO2 7.6% (7.5% as of December 31, 2023), Telefónica Germany 17.7% (17.8% as of December 31, 2023), Telefónica Brazil 22.2% (25.0% as of December 31, 2023) and Telefónica Hispam 14.1% (14.4% as of December 31, 2023). Part of the Group's assets are located in countries that do not have an investment grade credit rating (in order of importance, Brazil, Argentina (sold in February 2025), Ecuador and Venezuela). Likewise, Venezuela and Argentina are considered countries with hyperinflationary economies in 2024 and 2023.
During 2024, the contribution of each segment to the Telefónica Group's revenues was as follows (does not include VMO2 that is recorded by the equity method and therefore does not contribute to the consolidated revenues): Telefónica Spain 31.0% (31.1% in 2023), Telefónica Germany 20.6% (21.2% in 2023), Telefónica Brazil 23.3% (23.7% in 2023) and Telefónica Hispam 21.9% (20.6% in 2023).
The main risks by geography are detailed below:
In Europe, there are several economic and political risks. Firstly, the evolution of armed conflicts poses a threat to growth and inflation prospects. Any worsening in the supply of gas, oil, food, or other goods due to disruptions in the supply chain would negatively impact their prices, with a consequent effect on the disposable income of both households and businesses. In the medium term, this could result in wage increases, a persistent rise in inflation, and tighter monetary policy. Any of the above could have a negative impact on the cost of financing for the private sector, including Telefónica, and could trigger episodes of financial stress.
In addition, there is also a risk of financial fragmentation in the eurozone, meaning that interest rates may react differently in different countries within the eurozone, leading to differences in yields on bonds issued by more indebted countries (including Spain) and those issued by less indebted countries, making it challenging for the former to access credit at low rates.
Lastly, Europe faces three significant long-term risks. First, Europe may fall behind in the global technological race in particular because of both its dependence on several critical raw materials, indispensable for key sectors, that must be imported from other regions, and its lag in technological innovation. Second, a burdensome regulatory environment in the European Union poses a significant threat to business, impeding growth and eroding competitiveness, with companies based in countries and regions where regulations are relatively less complex, extensive or restrictive. Third, demographic factors such as declining birth rates and population aging may have a negative impact on the region's labor force and long-term growth prospects.
Regarding political risk, centrist political groups maintained a majority following the 2024 European Parliament elections but nationalist and populist parties made significant gains. It remains to be seen whether greater fragmentation in the parliament will hinder governance and the continuity of the ongoing agenda in fiscal and economic matters, climate and energy policy as well as other aspects of regional governance.
- Spain: there are several local sources of risks. One of them stems from the risk that high commodity prices and/or the emergence of wage pressures could prolong the inflationary episode with a deeper impact on household income. Secondly, further delays in the disbursement of Next Generation European Funds (NGEU) could limit their final impact on GDP growth and employment. In addition, as one of the most open countries in the world from a commercial point of view, being among the top ten countries in respect of capital outflows and inflows globally, Spain could be negatively impacted by the rise of protectionism and trade restrictions. Lastly, the impact of higher-for-longer interest rates could be a source of financial stress due to high public indebtedness and lead to a possible correction in the real estate market. In the long term, the challenge is to increase the growth of potential GDP through improvements in productivity and investment and ensure the sustainability of public debt.
- Germany: the risk of energy shortages has diminished recently due to Europe's response in terms of diversification of energy sources and the rapid construction of regasification plants in the country. However, it is possible that problems with energy supply may arise again. Alternative sources for gas imports could be limited, consumption could be higher due, for example, to an unusually cold winter, or competition for gas from other countries could increase. On the other hand, there is concern that higher-than-expected wage growth and/or higher input costs could lead to more persistent inflation diminishing competitiveness among the manufacturing sector. As for the medium to long term, there is a risk that prolonged or escalating geopolitical tensions could reduce international trade or increase competition to German-made products with a consequent impact on the country's potential growth, which is dependent on exports. Additionally, following the German federal election, it is relevant that a stable majority is formed capable of addressing the major challenges facing the country, especially in terms of investment needs. Finally, long-term challenges remain, such as the ageing of the population.
- United Kingdom: more persistent inflation could weigh on consumption and further depress economic growth. In particular, there is a concern that currently dynamic wage growth could lead to a further increase in the prices of goods and services, preventing inflation rates from totally normalizing. On the other hand, although the UK economy has few direct trade links with Russia and Ukraine, it is vulnerable to developments in the global energy market as it is the second European economy with the largest share of gas in the energy mix. Finally, the formal exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union on December 31, 2020 (Brexit) has created new barriers to trade in goods and services, mobility and cross-border exchanges, which will continue to entail an economic adjustment in the medium term.
In Latin America, the exchange rate risk is currently considered moderate by the Telefónica Group, except in Venezuela, but may increase in the future. The end of electoral events and rapid central bank actions to contain inflation may, at least partially, limit the impact of external risks (global trade tensions, abrupt movements in commodity prices, concerns about global growth, tightening U.S. monetary policy and financial imbalances in China) and internal risks (managing the monetary normalization and the possible fiscal deterioration) but there is no assurance that this will be the case.
- Brazil: fiscal sustainability and increased economic intervention remain the main domestic risk. Despite recently announced measures to curb public spending, tax reforms aimed at simplifying the indirect tax system and promoting stronger and sustainable economic growth and an upward revision of Brazil's credit rating outlook by Moody's, volatility surrounding fiscal sustainability has increased. Moreover, inflation expectations have continued to deteriorate following the poor performance of the Brazilian real in a context of fiscal volatility, paving the way for further interest rate hikes and increasing the risks of a more pronounced economic slowdown.
- Chile, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador: these countries are exposed not only to changes in the global economy, given their vulnerability and exposure to changes in commodity prices, but also to tightening of global financial conditions. On the domestic side, existing political instability and the possibility of further social unrest and the resurgence of populism could have a negative impact in both the short and medium term. In this regard, measures that result in excessive growth in public spending that jeopardize fiscal balance could have a negative impact on sovereign credit ratings, further deteriorating local financing conditions. If inflation is more persistent than expected, this could limit central banks' ability to respond to an abrupt drop in activity levels and could also increase the risk of financial instability. Political uncertainty has decreased in Chile, following the rejection of a proposed new Constitution in December 2023, but the maintenance of the former status quo could give rise to new social demands. A presidential election is due to take place in November 2025 (and a runoff election may follow in December 2025). In Colombia, the structural reforms promoted by Colombia's government are expected to be more market friendly due to the weakening of the government coalition. In Peru, the government succeeded in reducing the social protests against the installation of the current administration, although it remains politically weak. In
Ecuador, presidential and legislative elections were held in February 2025. The election took place against a backdrop of unprecedented social and economic challenges, as well as armed conflicts between the government and several organized crime groups. A run-off presidential election will be held in April 2025.
As discussed above, the countries where the Group operates are generally facing significant economic uncertainties and, in some cases, political uncertainties. The worsening of the economic and political environment in any of the countries where Telefónica operates may materially adversely affect the Group's business, financial condition, results of operations and/or cash flows.